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The Constitution for Europe and Criminal Law: a step not far enough 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
This Special Issue of the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law is the 
off-spin of an Expert Meeting held in Maastricht in August 2004 between a number of 
European experts on the European Dimensions of Criminal Law.1 The meeting was 
initiated to consider the consequences of the further Europeanisation of the field of 
criminal law and its future perspectives. The three contributions to this issue testify to 
the changing perspectives that are underway, and represent the three different levels 
relevant to the debate. Whereas Joachim Vogel, Professor of Criminal Law and 
Criminal Procedure, Universität Tübingen, deals with the idea of an European 
Integrated Criminal Justice System (meta-level), Anne Weyembergh, Assistant 
Professor and Assistant Director of the Institute for European Studies at the Université 
Libre de Bruxelles, focuses on a specific principle (meso-level, i.e. harmonisation) 
within that system. Kai Ambos, Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, 
Comparative Law and International Criminal Law at the Georg-August Universität 
Göttingen, goes to the heart of criminal responsibility in his contribution, and 
investigates whether common norms of substantive criminal law can be developed 
(micro-level). 
 
In this editorial I would like to offer a brief consideration of the relationship between 
a possible European criminal justice system and the national systems. This will be 
done in the context of the new Constitution for Europe. What changes will the 
Constitution bring in this respect? What opportunities could and should have been 
used?2  
 
§2. The Constitution for Europe 
 
                                                 
1 The meeting was organised by the Criminal Law Department of Maastricht University on behalf of 
the Human Rights Research School, in which Utrecht University, Erasmus Rotterdam University, Open 
University Netherlands and Maastricht University participate. 
2 At the time of writing, the results of the referenda in France (29 May) and in the Netherlands (1 June) 
were unknown. 
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The Constitution for Europe brings a number of changes to the criminal law of the 
European Union. The Charter of Fundamental Rights has been incorporated and the 
area of freedom, security and justice has been given a new chapter (Articles III-257-
277).  The new treaty creates (once again) new legal instruments that are applicable in 
the field of criminal law:3  European laws and European framework laws (Art.III-
270). 
 
The treaty bases almost its entire policy in the field of mutual recognition on a 
principle that it does not define: mutual recognition (Articles III-260 and 270). It is 
also interesting to see the word harmonisation used now for the first time instead of 
approximation (Article III-272). An organic law is now required for Eurojust (Article 
III-273), the European Public Prosecutor (Article III-274) and Europol (article III-
276). One of the most important steps is the mandate given to the European Council 
to establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (Article III-274).  
 
Whereas on the one hand the position of the European Parliament has been 
strengthened, the position of states has become much weaker. An individual state may 
no longer make a proposal for new acts, as there must now be at least a quarter of 
Member States supporting a proposal (Art. III-264). Only if a Member State considers 
that a draft European framework law could affect ‘fundamental aspects of its criminal 
justice system, may it request that the draft framework law be referred to the 
European Council.’ (Art. III-270, par. 3 and 271, par. 3). 
 
In other aspects, the Treaty demonstrates that much remains the same. Despite the fact 
that ‘operational planning’ is now mentioned in Article III-258, in the field of 
criminal law the steering instrument remains legislation. The basic problem herewith 
is that it requires implementation and enforcement by national authorities. This has 
two important consequences. The first is that much of its binding effect will get lost 
and that the enforcement mechanism is weak. The second is that the European 
legislator is not involved in law enforcement. It is far away from the day to day 
                                                 
3 The Treaty does not clarify the relationship between the new legal instruments and the older ones that 
were enacted under the Maastricht regime (such as joint actions) or the Amsterdam regime (framework 
decisions). How do Article I-6 (The Constitution and law adopted by the institutions shall have 
primacy over the law of the Member States) and Article I-33 (A European framework law shall be a 
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concerns of crime and criminal justice. Thus, it does not learn from its own 
experiences and is unable to get a real picture of the volume and nature of crime.  
 
The chosen method of development is thus counter-productive. The real influence of 
the harmonisation model has so far been marginal, or even absent.4 In the first place 
this has to do with the character of compromise legislation. Instruments are often 
vaguely written and non-binding. Every member state is left some room as to the 
interpretation of the instruments. The second reason for the variety of enforcement is 
the fact that implementation is obligatory. By interpreting the implementation 
obligations in a ‘rather national’ way in its domestic implementing legislation, it is 
possible for a member state that tasted defeat in the negotiation process to have its 
own way after all. The third reason exists in the absence of a common court. The 
actual role of the Court of Justice in the explanation of Framework Decisions in 
preliminary rulings is yet to be determined. The fourth reason is the use of different 
authentic languages. This leads to situations in which there are major differences in 
the final enforcement in the member states. The European Union has grown from 15 
to 25 member states, from 375 million citizens to 450 million citizens. That 
magnitude makes the finding of a common denominator even harder than now. The 
vague norms that result from it will further decrease the binding force of 
harmonisation. The new treaty does not bring this to an end. To the contrary, it further 
facilitates compromise legislation. This will lead to more freedom for the executive in 
the interpretation of the law, endangering the rule of law.  
 
§3. Choices I: a separate European system 
 
One of the most prominent changes concerns the establishment of a European Public 
Prosecutor. However, the Constitution fails to provide this new institution with the 
necessary legal tools to perform its task. Article III-274 states that the European 
Public Prosecutor will exercise its function in national courts. The Constitution does 
not change the applicable national law. This means that the added value of a European 
                                                                                                                                            
legislative act binding, as to the result to be achieved upon a Member State to which it is addressed, but 
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods) relate? 
4 See for example T. VanderBeken, From Brussels with Love, Bespiegelingen over de invloed van de 
Europese Unie op het Belgisch strafrecht, Preadvies voor de Vereniging voor de vergelijkende studie 
van het recht van België en Nederland, 2002. 
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Public Prosecutor is limited to the decision to prosecute. It is questionable whether it 
makes sense to establish such a prosecutor for that reason only. The prosecution of the 
cases brought by the EPP will be conducted in a hybrid system, between a European 
criminal justice and a national criminal justice system. It is regrettable that the 
European law determining the general rules of the European Prosecutor is limited to 
procedural matters. It misses the development of substantive law, especially of the 
general part of criminal law. Every national criminal justice system has a general part 
that determines under which conditions conduct is regarded as criminal and to which 
extent a perpetrator must have had the intent to commit certain behaviour. For 
instance, breaking a shop window is only a crime of vandalism if a person 
deliberately intended to break the window, not if a person stumbled over his feet and 
fell into it. The general part of criminal law can be regarded as the foundation on 
which each criminal justice system is built. Most jurisdictions have therefore codified 
the general part in the first section of their Penal Code. 
 
Although all criminal justice systems in the world have constructed notions of 
criminal responsibility on the basis of these two factors (prohibited conduct and 
mental element) in one way or another, their concepts, applications and codifications 
differ tremendously. Despite its influential legislation since 1992, the European Union 
has not formulated a general part. The EU has obliged its members to criminalise 
certain behaviour according to definitions (e.g. participation in a criminal 
organisation) and to allow the prosecution of legal entities (e.g. counterfeiting of the 
euro). It has also given rules on prohibited conduct and mental element with regard to 
illegal smuggling of immigrants. Although these examples are linked to specific 
crimes, they implicitly presume the existence of notions of a general part. Now that 
the European Union is establishing a European Public Prosecutor, taking the first step 
towards direct enforcement, it is time to make the underlying choices explicit. 
Otherwise it will hardly be possible to stipulate a consistent policy of prosecution.  
 
The tremendous importance of conceptualising a general part lies, on the one hand, in 
the hypothesis that if there is no common view on the general part, then the actual 
enforcement of criminal law in the EU will differ from state to state, which may stand 
in the way of further integration of Europe. On the other hand, the eventual 
establishment of a European criminal justice system with the competence of direct 
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enforcement, in the sense that a European Public Prosecutor may prosecute before an 
European Criminal Court, requires the drafting of a general part. 
 
The Constitution represents a missed opportunity not to start the construction of a 
European criminal justice system. Although Europol, Eurojust, European Public 
Prosecutor are now provided for, they have their main tasks in the co-operation 
between the Member States. The logical step to proceed to a separate European 
system was not taken. 
 
§4. Choices II: complete harmonisation 
 
The self-evident explanation for further European integration is too simple: we need 
European criminal law because of the ideals of European integration and because 
citizens are not able to move freely in a situation in which one state criminalises what 
is legal in another.5 After all, Europe has a much longer tradition in diversity than in 
uniformity. To a certain extent, things in law are as with food. One may certainly 
hope that European food regulations will not lead to cheese, sausages and tomatoes 
having exactly the same taste all over Europe. What matters is not whether Dutch 
cheese is better than Italian cheese or French cheese. What matters is that various 
cheeses are different. The availability of choice contributes to the quality of life. In 
this respect, the United States’ system of a Model Penal Code may also offer an 
example, especially in view of the fact that the model laws lack obligatory effect for 
the states. This has certainly given more time to the drafters and contributed positively 
to its quality and clarity. 
 
Complete Europeanisation would lead to static law, in which no experiments can be 
undertaken. The experience of other states may not contribute to the development of 
law. In my opinion, one could consider Europeanisation of criminal law if there is a 
concrete practical necessity for doing that. Then, one should even support the creation 
                                                 
5 This argument conflicts with another argument that presumes that criminals profit from the 
differences in the various legal systems. It is hardly conceivable that one group of EU citizens (those 
who commit crimes) are extremely well versed in comparative criminal law in order to select the best 
place for the commission of a crime, whereas the other group of EU citizens (those who do not commit 
crime) are paralyzed in their freedom by the mere existence of differences between the criminal justice 
systems within the EU. 
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of a full-fledged European Criminal Justice System, a step much further than the one 
taken by the Constitution. 
 
§5. Choices III: a partly European, partly national system 
 
What could such an arrangement look like? At the occasion of the opening of 
Eurojust, some two years ago, the Dutch Minister of Justice suggested the creation of 
a special European competence for certain cross-border criminal offences, leaving the 
remainder of criminal offences to the national authorities.6 To cut a long story short, it 
was his point of view that it is no use to harmonize the entire criminal justice system 
because 90% of all criminal offences have only a national connection. The proposal of 
the Minister was not worked out in detail, but it was very interesting. Surprisingly, 
this idea was not followed by a proposal, even though the Netherlands held the 
presidency during the second half of 2004.  
 
However, the Minister’s idea deserves a follow-up. A division between European and 
national criminal law implies a complete European criminal justice system, a 
European criminal court, a European Prosecution, European police, all based on 
European legislation and supervised by a freely elected European Parliament. If we do 
this, it requires a conceptualization of what is to be European criminal law and what is 
to be national criminal law. However, in the memorandum released by the Dutch 
Minister of Justice in March 2004, the government retains the condition of double 
criminality in co-operation with other Member States where the proscribed conduct 
has been committed in the Netherlands.7  Consequently, if the crime is committed and 
not liable to punishment in the Netherlands, no international co-operation can be 
provided.  
 
A different model could be based on the following: if the point is that foreign 
countries can not claim jurisdiction over offences that are not liable to punishment 
here, yet they are committed here, then the restriction of jurisdiction ought to be the 
                                                 
6 A few days later this point of view was reiterated in the Memorandum on a European Legal Space, 
see Een Europese strafrechtelijke ruimte van 9 mei 2003 van de Staatssecretaris voor Europese Zaken, 
kenmerk DIE-258/03. 
 6
leading principle. This leads to a completely different rule: jurisdiction inside the 
European Union is only to be established on a state’s own territory. In this view 
Germany can no longer prosecute (soft) drug abuse in the Netherlands by a German 
citizen. But it also means that if the Greeks deem it necessary to make the “spotting” 
of registration numbers of airplanes criminally liable, the Netherlands will assist them 
with investigation and prosecution. This requires a considerable degree of trust (or 
mutual recognition), but it also offers tremendous advantages for the enforcement of 
law as well as for the protection of the rights of individuals. It is always clear which 
state can be called upon to enforce. After all, the present situation of overlapping 
jurisdiction leads to a continuous discussion between Member States as to whether an 
offence should be criminalized and what criminal policy should be followed. 
Moreover, abolishing the double criminality requirement and restricting jurisdiction to 
the territory of the state where the crime was committed builds upon on the existing 
network of international co-operation in criminal matters. After all, the network of co-
operation of the Council of Europe has never been able to incorporate one important 
theme: an arrangement for jurisdiction conflicts.8 The expansion of jurisdiction over 
national borders once originated from the concern that a suspect might get off scot-
free and that it therefore should be possible to call him to account in his own country, 
but not to correct the criminal policy of another country. In the end, there are differing 
opinions about just a few crimes. Most of the criminal offences have been made liable 
to punishment in some sort of form in the entire Union. The differences that remain 
are probably too important to neglect. The demarcation just presented deals with the 
relation between different Member States. It gives no solution for difficult cases in 
which the locus delicti can not be easily placed in one state. These cases ought to be 
arranged on a Union level. We therefore need to set criteria for the cases that should 
be dealt with on a European level.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
7 Memorandum on the requirement of double criminality (Notitie Het vereiste van dubbele 
strafbaarheid in het Nederlandse strafrecht), Parliamentary Documents Second Chamber, 2003-2004, 
29451, nr.1.  
8 Various attempts to solve the problem by means of priority rules with regard to jurisdictional 
principles failed. However, it did lead to an interesting study: European Committee on Crime 
Problems, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 1990. If the European 
Union were to prevent jurisdictional conflicts, it would finally respond to its obligations under Article 
31(c) Treaty on European Union and Article III-270 Constitution for Europe. 
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What could these criteria for a distinction between a European and the nationals’ 
criminal justice systems be? In the memorandum ‘European criminal law’ presented 
by the Dutch government in 2003, the following was stated: ‘An effective war on 
crime against the interests of the Union (forgery of the Euro and fraud against the 
financial interests of the Community) and of severe cross border crime, that has to be 
defined but which can vary from smuggling of illegal goods or persons to the harming 
of the environment, will in the end demand  its own homogeneous jurisdiction that is 
not cut through by national borders.’9  
 
In fact, the Minister appeals to criminological insights with regard to the 
manifestations of crime and, in particular, with regard to the question as to whether 
the offences concerned are border cross-border ones. In my opinion, this is the correct 
road. I consider the current methodology not very well thought-through: establishing 
an organisation first, such as, Europol, the European Public Prosecutor, or introducing 
new criminal offences about topics in the news right before a European summit. After 
all, this only concerns image building, not the real law.  
 
The demarcation ought to be found in the rules on jurisdiction and on substantive 
criminal law, not in conditions for co-operation. For this reason, criminal offences 
that are to be part of the European criminal law should meet certain conditions. What 
are these conditions? In my opinion there are three cumulative conditions: 
 
1. the criminal offence manifests a cross-border character. 
2. the prevention, tracing and trying of such an offence experiences more 
difficulties on national level than on a European level. 
3. the criminal offence is related to a European field of policy.10  
  
The first condition requires that qualifying criminal offences have a locus delicti in 
several countries, which makes it difficult to designate one particular state as the most 
appropriate one. Examples of such offences are to be found in customs and excise 
law, subsidy fraud, money laundering, trafficking in human beings and drugs and 
                                                 
9 Memorandum of 9 May 2003. 
10 See André Klip, Uniestrafrecht/ Criminal Law in the European Union, Inaugural Lecture Maastricht, 
Kluwer Deventer 2004. 
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arms trade. The second condition deals with efficiency. If the case involves border 
crossing aspects but national law enforcement agencies can handle them without 
problems, there is no need for European involvement. The third element ensures that 
various enforcement modalities are seen in coherence, but it also emphasizes the need 
for subsidiarity.  
 
Naturally, there will be suspects that will not follow such a division of jurisdiction 
when they plan to commit a crime. Factual complications will occur in which suspects 
commit European and national criminal offences. The principle of a fair 
administration of justice, derived from the transfer of proceedings, can play a decisive 
role in the search for the most appropriate forum here. 
 
Thus, the European legal area leads to three rather well-defined jurisdictions: national, 
European and outside the European Union. I feel less enthusiastic about the mandate 
given in the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor as expressed in Article III-
274 that creates a hybrid system, that keeps to the middle road between national and 
European enforcement. Similar objections exist against the American solution in 
which the definition between federal and state criminal law is not very clear and leads 
to several jurisdictional conflicts. If we decide to introduce a new European criminal 
justice system, the European influence on the national criminal justice system will be 
much less. Furthermore, it dissolves the objection that national priorities would be 
suppressed when further hierarchal competences are given to Europol or Eurojust.  
 
§6. Realism instead of Utopianism 
 
It is not all roses in such a perspective. A European system inevitably also has 
negatives attached to it. New organs are created, which leads to a increase of data 
flow. A system like this also needs to be psychologically accepted by national law 
enforcement agencies. A new institute should not be seen as a threat or as a 
competitor and in this way be deprived of information. The not particularly 
prosperous position of Europol makes one pessimistic.  
 
Harmonisation of national criminal law is not necessary for a system chosen above in 
which there is a European criminal justice system for certain offences and a national 
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criminal justice system for the other offences. The present harmonisation of criminal 
law has been criticized many times and for good reasons as it starts from the impure 
premise that double criminality stands in the way of cooperation in criminal matters.  
 
Starting from separate jurisdictions – a European one with regard to specific European 
offences and several national jurisdictions on behalf of national offences – there is 
then no need for the condition of double criminality. Accordingly, one reason for 
harmonisation of substantive criminal law is lost. Although harmonisation may fulfil a 
function with regard to procedural aspects of law. This requires an explanation. 
 
If the Member States accept from each other that the execution of jurisdiction is 
exclusive, this will lead to an important contribution to an unconditional mutual 
recognition of hand-over warrants of persons and exhibits and other decisions. In a 
system of unconditional recognition, the barriers between criminal justice systems 
disappear. In order to achieve complete freedom of movement, several obstacles have 
to be removed. For example, the conditions to proceed with the apprehension of 
suspects differ from one member state to another. This puts a member state under 
pressure that sets higher conditions. Similar problems can occur by other means of 
coercion and the collection of evidence. The convergence towards one another of the 
conditions that are to be fulfilled  before search and seizure is allowed will take away 
the objections against the recognition of a foreign order.  
 
Such findings show the need for a conceptualization of the principle of mutual 
recognition. It is here that the Constitution suffers from its greatest lacuna. Mutual 
recognition is regarded as a corner stone of its policy in criminal law, but is has not 
been defined. What is it exactly that needs to be recognized and by whom (first)? That 
some material conditions need to be met before applying any methods of coercion? 
That a certain authority has determined this? That the requested country applies the 
procedural rules for collecting evidence as applied by the requesting state? And why 
should the obligatory execution of a foreign request interfere with the state’s own 
administration of justice? In short, the notion needs to be provided with a concept.  
 
In the present situation, the state that makes the first move determines that another 
state ought to acknowledge something. Why in a system of mutual recognition should 
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a state that prosecutes be given priority over a state that has decided to attach no 
consequences to a certain act? With the limitation of jurisdiction, such a question is 
no longer under discussion.  
 
The already vague concept of mutual recognition is made even more unclear through 
the existence of now 20 official languages. When enforcement becomes a common  
European task, there is no place for the differences resulting from the use of different 
languages. In striving for integration and harmonization, the Union creates a huge 
barrier by holding on to the fact that all European languages are considered as 
authentic languages.  
 
By choosing one language, room is given for one European legal language to grow. It 
speaks for itself that the choice is likely to be English. This might lead to a problem 
because it may be assumed that the more common part of the criminal justice systems 
of the member states lies in a civil law structure. Experiences in the various 
international criminal courts show that a complete new system originates, finding its 
own balance in spite of the fact that specific regulations come from different systems. 
Therefore, it should be possible that a European legal language, English, extricates 
itself from the specific national context. We will be much better able to understand 
each other if we can base our discussion on the same binding legal text, instead of 
different languages versions. 
 
§7. Concluding remarks 
 
The first impression of the Constitution as a stimulant to further European integration 
is false. It does not formulate its goals well and fails to specify why a role in the field 
of criminal law should be given to the European Union. The new Constitution offers 
more freedom to the executive on the national level. Comprise legislation that 
requires national implementation paves the way for that, even though now provided 
with more democratic legitimation by the European parliament. Despite this missed 
opportunity, academics should continue to reflect on what a European criminal justice 
system could and should look like in the long run. This also means that it is not a 
disaster if not all Member States were to ratify the Constitution. New negotiations can 
only lead to a better result. Although it might not be a political reality of today, no one 
 11
knows when it will become an urgent matter. As the drastic legal measures taken after 
9/11 in the European Union and elsewhere have taught us, unexpected events can 
serve as a trigger mechanism for decisions that would never be taken in a quiet 
political setting. In such a context, one does well to be prepared.  
 
André Klip 
 12
